During the 24 years of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, to talk about its cultural individuality as a product of its history -focusing on what set it apart from Indonesia -was an act likely to raise suspicions of some kind of manipulation of history for political purposes. Naturally, the same suspicions could fall on anyone assuming an opposite view, that is a view that valued the connection uniting the two peoples and discarded what separated them. In this paper, we adhere more to the first perspective. Obviously, we are not driven by the desire to prove that East Timor had to be, a priori, independent; this is by no means the task of a historian. We are simply trying to explain, a posteriori, why, in the referendum of 30 August 1999, the people of East Timor voted overwhelmingly for independence.
History does not determine history
In fact, the history of a people, as human history in general, is complex enough to be almost always possible, looking carefully to eventually find evidence of all that is desired; but such a use of history is not very honest. It is even more important to note that the past of a people does not ineluctably determine its present or its future, as if their collective will did not exist; however, to some extent, it does condition it. Some historical continuity is rather the result of geographic constraints. While for instance Hungary was never a great maritime power, and stands little chance of becoming one, this has obviously to do with its continental position and its lack of exits to the sea. In what follows, we will address some of the geographical constraints which have influenced, over the centuries, the history of Timor.
On the other hand, although history does not determine history, it is, in some way, conditioned by the awareness that men have in relation to it, which often leads them to react in the same way to the same challenges or to similar challenges. However, in this case, what conditions their reaction is precisely the subjective consciousness of history, rather than history objectively considered, as it would happen if the free will of manconsidered individually or collectively -was also subject to the law of eternal return. We should equally bear in mind the degree of subjectivity in any perspective on History, knowing that even the greatest specialists -be them the strictest positivists, religiously committed to the truth of the facts testified to in the documents -can never claim absolute objectivity.
As regards the first point, somehow methodological, we must also add another preliminary observation: it obviously involves discussions on the history of Timor, in an attempt to identify the continuities that underlie it, and not just merely tell it, not even briefly. The history of East Timor is in fact quite tedious, full of controversies, fights, small conflicts, small details almost deprived of meaning. Nevertheless, seen from a long-term perspective, they resemble the small waves stirring the lake waters in a windy afternoon: small waves agitate the water surface, while a little deeper, they remain quiet. The history of Timor is just the same: seen from a microscope, it is very hectic and amazingly exciting; but analysed more thoroughly, and on the longer run, it points to some clear general features and a significant continuity.
From geography to history
It is precisely this consistency, afforded by the main arguments of a structural nature that we seek to identify here, even running the risk of giving the history of Timor an idyllic vision, by putting between brackets all the conflicts that make up -most definitely -the fabric of everyday life. It is, however, a mental exercise that should be done, provided we do not lose sight of the risk it entails. This is the price to pay in order to identify factors that seem permanent, structural and structuring behind the events whose thoroughness may confuse us. Thus, instead of scrutinizing the facts, we will only mention some details that seem significant, without paying much attention to their chronology, even if their selection remains a bit subjective. In short, rather than a study of history, what follows here is more of a historical essay.
It is perhaps not superfluous to point out that, in order to better understand the case of Timor, it is necessary to forget the world map as we are used to seeing it most of the times -that is, a political map on which each country seems to be delimited by a single colour frame, giving the impression of an often misleading uniformity. This custom spread quickly in the 19 th century Europe, especially after 1848, thanks to the generalization of the concept of national sovereign state.
Of course, in the mapping of previous centuries, there were also states with precise contours, such as the Kingdom of France or that of Portugal, but there were also spaces that corresponded more to natural or ethnolinguistic regions, such as the "province of Tartary", "the region of Laos", etc. Modern toponimy preserves, usually without even realizing it, many remnants of this somewhat primacy of the territory's inhabitants, as it is the case with Manaus, Tocantins, Tapajós, Goiás, etc. in Brazil, or that of Laos in Asia; they all preserve the Portuguese s for the plural, showing that before becoming place names, they were actually ethnonyms, whose geographical contours necessarily remained vague. As a matter of fact, in many areas, the concepts of sovereignty and border did not even have the quasi absolute character they had in Europe; a case in point is provided by the Portuguese who, in the 18 th century, still called rei do choutiá, i.e., "king of the quarter", a Hindu kinglet close to their territory of Daman, India, since according to immemorial customs, he had the right to perceive a quarter of the country's public revenue, disregarding the waving Portuguese flag. Similarly, in Macau, up until the Opium Wars, the power had been shared among the Senate of the former Republic of Portuguese merchants, which had given birth to the city, the Portuguese captain or governor ruling since 1623 and a Chinese mandarin, who retained the authority on everything that was in the interest of the government in Beijing, on which it depended.
Nevertheless, in the 19 th century, the regions that did not correspond to states with precise borders tended to be regarded as aberrations -which, of course, justifies the claims of the colonial powers to seize them -and the state began to be considered as the only form of "civilized" organization of societies, contained in defined geographic boundaries with an almost millimetre precision. Especially after the Conference of Berlin, this horror of the empty of the political mapping spread to all continents, and people began to draw borders everywhere. However, this primacy of the political map shows the downside of suggesting the idea that the state is first-class data, the people constituting no more than mere content. From this perspective, the cleavages often found within many states become incomprehensible. Especially in South East Asia, in the region where Timor is located, there was a tendency to consider a kingdom as a sort of chandelier, whose light gradually tarnished as one walked away, while the light of another became increasingly visible. There were, therefore, political "cones of darkness", a notion nowadays outdated, yet essential to understanding the history of many regions. We will shortly return to it, because the notion of "political penumbra" proves quite adequate to describe the situation in Timor in relation to Portugal up until the last years of the 19 th century.
The abuse of the use of modern political maps often gives students of history, even beginner historians, the illusion that the political map of today's world constitutes the eternal or at least the definitive possible form, whose previous versions would be no more than a kind of prehistory or, at most, an adolescent stage of history. This is particularly sensitive in Portugal, where the border with Spain, set by the Treatise of Alcanizes in 1297, is not only the oldest in the world, but also a simultaneously cultural, linguistic and political limit.
Therefore, whether it pleases or not the politicians, on behalf of the objectivity of science, political maps have to be complemented always by ethnological, religious and linguistic maps, of which they often hide or disguise the borders and the contours. Generally, the borders of SouthEast Asia are more or less recent, and they mask other fractures and other union lines. For example, beyond Indonesia as it is known today, there are peoples who share the same language and, therefore, have many common cultural traits; examples of this kind are those of Malaysia, and a part of Thailand, not to mention those who speak languages belonging to the same family and cultures more or less related. Aside from Irian Barat (New Western Guinea that Indonesia inherited from the Netherlands and which, from an ethno-linguistic point of view, has little to do with its territory), the Eastern border of Indonesia has a certain cultural consistency, as it roughly coincides with the traditional boundary of grain crops and large livestock breeding, including buffaloes, essential for ploughing the paddy fields. In the East, in Melanesia, only tubers crops and pig breeding were known; in the South, in Australia, the Neolithic revolution had not even occurred; also, neither agriculture nor livestock breeding were known, and people lived off the ground through gathering and hunting. It is interesting to note that Timor is located close to both these historical and cultural boundaries, on the edge of the Old World; thus, its marginality accounts for many features of its history.
Indeed, this double border roughly corresponds to the limit of the known world in the Antiquity and the Middle Ages by the higher civilizations of Eurasia. That is, in addition to the technology of metals, they were also familiarised to the urban phenomenon, the state organization and, more importantly, mastered the art of writing, the main tool for transmitting knowledge. In fact, neither the Chinese, nor the Indians, the Arabs or the Persians sailed, at least not on a regular basis, beyond the line which passes through the East of the Philippines and the Moluccas, the West of New Guinea and between Timor and Australia. This sinuous line which constitutes, so to say, the traditional boundary of the Insulindia, roughly coincides with the boundary of the world known and used for maritime trade before the Iberian discoveries. Obviously, more important than trade, there was the cultural integration favoured by business contacts, such as the diffusion of Indian religions (Buddhism and Hinduism) during the late Middle Ages, and of the Islam starting with the late 13 th century. It is important to point out that their distribution was not uniform in the Indies, that is, in the vast archipelago that includes not only present-day Indonesia, Timor, Brunei, the Philippines or Malaysia, bound by a kind of geological hazard to the Asian continent, but rather by the population of the Archipelago.
The spread of Indian and Arab-Islamic influences was very limited East from the Wallace line. It is true that Wallace had drawn it on wildlife-based criteria rather than on the flora, not to mention human culture. We now know that the reasons supporting this border, especially the zoological one, lies in the fact that it actually constitutes the limit of the territories emerged during the Quaternary glaciations; the large mammals of the Old World were unable to move past them in their attempt to reach the islands which, just as Timor, were at no time in the geological history of our planet attached to the continents, be that Eurasia, Sahul, which included Australia and New Guinea. Men were able to use boats -which were more or less sophisticated -depending on the time and culture they belonged to, and thus, the changes in the sea level did not condition them to populate the land, and even less to engage in commercial activities. Anyway, what really matters here is not necessarily finding explanations on how the spread of Hinduism roughly coincides with that of the tiger or the elephant, but to note that in many natural and cultural respects, there are sharp contrasts between the Western and the Eastern half of the East Indies. The lineclearly poorly defined -that separates them, roughly coincides with the boundaries of the area of influence of the great Asian civilizations -at least that of India, as some Chinese influence is traceable in the current Philippines and Northern Borneo. Nevertheless, Timor lies beyond these limits.
It is true, on the other hand, the influence of the Muslim world 3 -which, in this part of the world, until the 17 th century took the form of Persian and Gujarati rather than Arab influence -has transgressed in some places this dividing line, curiously on the eve of the Portuguese arrival in the area: Islam established itself in the second half of the 15 th century in the small islands of the Moluccas and Banda. This one-time transgression is due to a rather fortuitous circumstance: the Muslims sought for spice producing islands, bringing with them Islam which was thus implanted in the region nearly 50 years before the arrival of the Portuguese 4 . Since the Muslim merchants were interested, just like the Buddhists and Hindus once did, not only in the trade of cloves from Maluku and the nutmeg and mace from Banda, but also in the commerce of sandalwood from Timor, one might wonder why their influence has not established itself here as it did there. We can only speculate on this. Maybe the trade of sandalwood, valued especially in China, was less intensive than the trade of the spices mentioned above, especially since the Santalum album, brought perhaps by the Indians from the region of Timor in the first centuries AD, was widely grown in the Mysore region, which dispensed them from going to look further. Also, perhaps the largest mass emerged from Timor -the largest island in the Sundaland -and the earthiness of its population, who preferred the wetter and healthier mountain areas, has effectively offset the influences exerted especially on the coast. In the following centuries, the influence of Islam spread to other areas, especially in the extreme South-West of Sulawesi, around Makassar, islamised in 1603, an issue that will be further discussed at a later point. But the Portuguese missionaries had already set foot in Timor and started its evangelisation, which prevented Islam to put down real roots. Similarly, the settlement of the Spanish countered its progress in the Philippine Archipelago. Although Indonesia was not officially an Islamic country, Islam continued to be a major factor of a certain cultural unity. However, it is virtually absent from Timor.
As it was also the case of the Indonesian Peninsula, in the Western half of the Archipelago, the only resistance to the influence of what is generally called the higher Asian civilizations was met from the peoples in mountain areas and in those areas that are almost inaccessible from the inside, which turned into ethnic minorities belonging to an archaic civilization, embedded as isolated pockets in most developed populations, masters of writing. This is the case of the Batak within Sumatra 5 and Dayak within Borneo 6 . On the contrary, in the Eastern half of Insulindia, there were small pockets of indianisation and, later, Islamisation, but without a homogeneous distribution of these cultural elements. There were, thus, nuclei of higher civilization, mastering the art of writing, which formed isolates there. In very general, and necessarily simplistic terms, we can say that the Eastern half of the Archipelago has thus preserved in a purer state -compared to its Western half -the original Austronesian civilization, similar to that of the islands of Micronesia and Polynesia, also populated by Austronesians, but practically virgin in what concerns the cultural elements of continental Asia. This is what made the people from the region more responsive to the Christian and European cultural influences, to which they could not oppose a codified religion or a culture organized on a written basis.
Therefore, in this regard, Timor has more historical affinities with the Pacific Islands than with the Sumatra, Java and Bali Islands -which are much closer -or South-West Sulawesi, even in closest vicinity.
The "Mesonesian" identity of Timor
Ignoring political boundaries, we could refer to this area that includes the Philippines and Timor and generally the entire Eastern half of Indonesia, by the name of Mesonesia. The term "Mesonesia" is justified by two aspects: on the one hand, this region is located in the middle, between an area that has been subjected to the cultural influence of Asia and includes the civilizations that mastered the art of writing, a state organization, codified religions, etc., and the Pacific Islands, which are virtually absent from such cultural elements. On the other hand, it is a region of the middle islands, clearly smaller compared to the large islands of the Asian continental shelf, such as Borneo, Sumatra and Java, but significantly larger than the Pacific Islands, which, in most cases, are quite small. The geographical fragmentation is more pronounced here compared to the western Insulindia and this has obviously contributed to complicating both the political integration and the dissemination of cultural elements. These two are, obviously, intertwined. Thus, it is not surprising that some factors related to cultural unity, such as the use of the Malay language, the Javanese concept of power and the presence of a Malay-Javanese elite or one assimilated to the Malay civilization, were only broadcast after the unification of almost the entire archipelago under the domination of the Netherlands. Moreover, Mesonesia is, therefore, a cone of darkness in the history of Indonesia.
It is important to note that, contrary to the Spanish expansion in the Philippines and the Portuguese in Timor, the Dutch settlement was aimed at purely mercantile purposes, interested neither in the dissemination of the Batavian culture nor in the expansion of Calvinism, even prohibiting, until fairly recently, missionary activities in its fields. Paradoxical as it may seem, the unification of Indonesia by the VOC, the Dutch East India Company, seems to have contributed more to the spread of the Malay-Javanese culture in the islands than to the penetration of the Dutch influence. There seem to be two reasons that somehow explain this apparent paradox: on the one hand, the disproportion between the immense territories acquired by the VOC and the smallness of Holland which made its demographic resources insufficient for the operation and administration of those territories; this led to the extensive use of the most advanced services in its areas, such as the Malays; on the other hand, its merchant pragmatism led it to use the Malay language in administration, to the detriment of the Dutch, which spared native elites that made use of these services the effort and expense of actually learning the language.
Pierre Guru, the great French geographer of tropical Asia, highlighted three fundamental unity factors for Indonesia: Islam, the Malay language (today officially called bahasa indonesia, "Indonesian language") and the pervasiveness of an administrative and cultural Malay-Javanese elite 7 . Thus, while coinciding with what the Dutch East Indies actually used to be, Indonesia is not an artificial country, constrained by arbitrary boundaries established by the various chances of colonial history. This explains why, despite the multiple centrifugal forces rampant especially in its eastern half, Indonesia has not disintegrated, more than half a century after the expulsion of the Dutch.
Islam, as we have already seen, has spread mainly in the 15 th century, in the shadow of the trade conducted by the Sultanate of Malacca, converted to the faith of Muhammad in 1414. Despite the sandalwood trade with Malacca at the time, and the Bugis and Makassars incursions in the 17 th century, Islam was never able to penetrate Timor. In the 1970 census, there were 450 Portuguese Muslims in Timor, of a population of over 610,000 inhabitants, hence not even one per thousand 8 .
It could even be argued that, at least in the Eastern half of Timor, Islam has on the contrary played a rather negative historical role, resulting in the polarization of the common people, or at least of the aristocracy, around Catholicism and the Portuguese protectorate. This development was mainly triggered by the 17 th century incursions of Java and especially Sulawesi Muslim corsairs in the area of Flores and Timor. Unlike the inhabitants of Timor who tended to concentrate in the mountainous regions inside the island, turning their back to the sea, the peoples in the south-east of the main island of Sulawesi had a notorious maritime tradition. Although there are indications that in the 16 th century, they were not yet engaged in long term trade, as they started to do later, it seems that in the last quarter of the century they had already sent privateers expeditions to the closest islands, sometimes reaching Timor. Nevertheless, the Makassar kingdom of Gowa -in the extreme south-east of the islandwas converted to Islam in 1603, quickly becoming an important commercial centre, so that in 1641 it also received many Portuguese merchants expelled from Malacca by the Dutch conquest 9 ; but the allied kingdom of Tallo, undoubtedly less frequented by merchants, continued to live mostly from the race. The Bugis, neighbours of the Makassars to the north, also embraced the Islamic faith in 1607 10 . This accounts for their marine raids, sometimes tinged with the jihad or the holy war, imprisoning and bringing into slavery the pagans of other islands. The Javanese pirates, Muslims themselves, also appeared occasionally in the area, engaged in the same practices, especially as they found in the Dutch a secure market for their slaves. It was precisely the lack of naval strength enabling them to resist these maritime incursions that led several kingdoms of Timor to accept the support of the Portuguese in the area, influenced by the Portuguese missionaries acting in the territory since the third quarter of the 16 th century; then, after the great Makassar incursion in 1641 -which resulted in more than 4,000 prisoners -it determined them to place themselves under the protection of the Portuguese crown. It is very likely that in the collective subconscious of East Timor, a kind of negative correlation between the desire for local freedom and the spectre of Islam was thus generated.
As for the Malay, we know it was already the language of the Seriwijaya Empire, with the capital in the Palembang region, in the south-east of Sumatra; also, from the 7 th to the 12 th century, it held the naval hegemony on the seas of the East Indies 11 . Without being able to accurately determine whether there were actual migrations of the Malay in the other islands, or there was simply a linguistic and cultural assimilation, Malay became the common language in most sea and river ports of Borneo, the Malacca Peninsula (where it soon became generalized) and elsewhere, as it happened in some remote islands in the Maluku Archipelago. Malay inscriptions dating back to the 10 th century were discovered in various places, including East Java and Luçon, or the Philippines. As the Greeks and the Carthaginians once did in the Mediterranean, the Malay of these ports, situated especially at the mouths of large navigable rivers or at their confluences, bound together by a common language and culture, acted as middlemen between the freight networks and the populations inhabiting the islands, to whom they were bound by neighbourly relations and economic dependence. It should be already noted that traces of such colonies had never been found on the coast of Timor.
The spread of Malay continued in the 15 th and 16 th centuries, due to the hegemony of the Malacca Sultanate, also of Malay language; then, as we have already indicated, it was also due to the Dutch policy, which preferred to require its agents to learn the lingua franca of the archipelago rather than teach its own language to indigenous populations. As we have already stated, Timor appears to have never played an important part in the longterm international trade, perhaps because the only important product it had to offer -sandalwood -was also in India, unlike the cloves from the Moluccas and the nutmeg from Banda, for which there were no other supply sources. Moreover, it seems that the Chinese were generally the ones who sought sandalwood in Timor, due to the closer vicinity compared to the Indian supply area 12 . Consequently, Timor has always been an isolated island, relatively low in foreign trade. Perhaps this is why the Malay language was used only in Timor as language of commerce in the ports of the north coast, especially in Ocussi and in Dili, as it results from a brief analysis of the Portuguese documentation. It is thus significant that while in Kupang, the capital of the Dutch Timor, the Malay eventually emerged as the language used in everyday life, to the detriment of Baikeno, Atoni or, as the Dutch say, Timoreesch -which, according to all probabilities, was at the origin of the vernacular -in Dili, the lingua franca of the territory, the Tetum, was the one to impose at the expense of the previously spoken Mambae, and not Malay, the middle and long term language of maritime trade 13 . The use of Malay, always limited, regressed significantly in late 19 th century 14 , so that during the Indonesian intervention, the Timorese who spoke it could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Easy grammar, phonetic spelling and clear pronunciation, related -although distantly -to most languages of Timor, Indonesian was easily assimilated as a means of communication, even as language of culture, but it never ceased to be seen as a foreign language and associated with the domination of the invader.
As for the Malay-Javanese administrative elite, it spread especially in the shadow of the Dutch power. As already seen, for the middle management staff of its administration, Holland relied especially on members of the most advanced and most literate tribes of Sumatra and Java and on members of the bourgeois elite of the Archipelago port cities, regarded, ever since the Middle Ages, as belonging to the Malay culture; these middle managers, who spread the Malay and some other elements of their culture, eventually came to contribute to the unity of the country 15 . In Timor, on the eve of the Indonesian intervention, 81% of the civil servants were Timorese, the rest were Portuguese from the mainland (c. 13%), Goans (c. 3%) and Cape Verdians (c. 3% ). Naturally, the Indonesian civil service appeared as an unnecessary intrusion, let alone the army that practically held the power and which, at least at executive level, was almost exclusively composed of Javanese.
A non-Indonesian national conscience
Logically, Indonesian national conscience, which was forged especially in the context of the fight for independence against the Netherlands, a conflict in which Timor did not get involved and about which it had very little news. The heroes of the Indonesian independence, most of whom were Javanese and Sumatran who had fought against the Netherlands, did not say anything to the people of Timor. Naturally, it is not the fact of having given their names to some streets in Dili which determine the inhabitants of Timor to vow them a cult.
Drawing upon these facts, we can argue that until the moment of the occupation, the main elements which made the cultural and moral unity of Indonesia were practically absent. There certainly was a certain linguistic and civilisation kinship, due to the common Austronesian substratum, but which was hardly more visible than the one between the inhabitants of Timor and those of the Philippines or other islands in the Pacific. The relationship between Timor and the Indonesia was thus fundamentally ambiguous. Under different circumstances, under another political regime and with an army less orientated towards oppression and violence, it is possible that the cultural links, which united Timor to the neighbouring islands, could have functioned in the opposite sense and become factors of integration. But the excesses of the soldiers and the attempt to impose the Javanese conception of power, which was a holistic, hierarchical and providencialist 16 , one, determined the inhabitants of Timor to favour what separated rather than what united them. The ambivalence of the structural factors was thus polarized towards in a centrifugal sense by the conjectural factors.
Timor had a deeply isolated life until the arrival of the Portuguese. Out of the literate peoples in Asia, the Chinese seem to have been the first who entered into contact with the island. At least, they were the first to write about its existence. The dynastic annals and the Chinese geographical texts, starting from the 13 th century, contain the only detailed references on the existence of Timor until the arrival of the Portuguese. "Detailed" means ten to twenty lines for each source, and they were repeating each other until the end of the 16 th century, when they started mentioning the arrival of the Portuguese on the island. It is however more than the information provided by the Arab texts, which only mention the island at the end of 15 th century and beginning of the 16 th , and only note the fact that south of the Moluccas and of Banda there is an island called Timor which produces sandalwood 17 . Javanese chronicles mention Timor since the 16 th century, but they are even more laconic, limiting themselves to mentioning the name of the island on the list of the territories which have paid tribute to the king of Måjåpahit, to East Java which was from the end of the 13 th century to the beginning of the 16 th , the main power in the Archipelago 18 .
The scarcity of historic relationships between Timor and Java is a historic factor which shouldn't be forgotten. It is true that Indonesia is not limited to Java and that its official language is the Malay, coming from Sumatra, and not the Javanese, which remains a hermetic language, a privilege of the closed ethnic group which spoke it traditionally. But the importance of the Java in Indonesia cannot be ignored, on the one hand because this island concentrates on 7% of the surface of the country 66% of its population 19 , and on the other hand because of the Javanese religious syncretism, and of its view on society and on power on which the Suharto regime was based.
Another aspect which can help us understand was happened in Timor is the fact that it seems that the island was already ethnically, linguistically and politically divided in two parts when the Europeans approached it 20 . This doesn't mean that the border from those times coincided with the presentday political border. Ocussi certainly belonged to West Timor; and the East Timor border was half a dozen leagues westwards than nowadays. It was especially a linguistic border. In fact, in the Western half of the island only one language was spoken, the one the Portuguese called baiqueno or vaiqueno, and the Dutch timoreesch, as it was the dominant language and basically the only one of their Timor; those who speak it call themselves atoni, a word which simply means "people" 21 . This language is also spoken in Ocussi.
On the contrary, in the Eastern half around twenty different languages are spoken, some of them foreign to the big Austronesian family and generally classed as Papuan 22 . But there is a vehicular language, the Tetum, which seems to have been used as lingua franca since the time when power was assumed, in this Eastern part of the island, by the king of Wai-Hali or Bé-Hali, who spoke the Tetum language. The king of Bé-Hali is usually called "emperor of the Belos" in the Portuguese texts of the 17 th century, as he exercised his sovereignty on the whole Eastern area, dominated by the Belu, the name of a Tetum language people. It is significant that when in 1642, as we shall see in the following lines, Bé-Hali was destroyed by a coalition of forces favourable to the Portuguese, other Tetum language kingdoms took over, who claimed the sovereignty on the remainder of the Belu countries, those of Luca and Camanaça. The one who had the hegemony on the other half of the island, which the Portuguese called Província do Servião or País do Servião (from Sorbian, the name of an ancient harbour situated East to the Ocussi) was king Sonba'i (the Senobai or "the Servião emperor" of the Portuguese sources), who spoke the baiqueno language. There were thus in Timor two confederations of kingdoms, with two distinct "official" languages, not to mention the multiplicity of local languages used in the País or Província dos Belos, that is in the Eastern half of the island, which also included the region of Atambua and of Bé-Hali, situated nowadays in the Indonesian Timor.
The Portuguese in the Orient and in Timor
We consider that it would be necessary to open a short parenthesis here, in order to explain how the Portuguese appeared on the coasts of Timor and whom we speak of exactly.
The Portuguese expansion in the Orient comprises three different sections, partly complementary but partly opposed. The first is the official or imperial expansion, well known through chronicles and archive documents, on which we needn't insist. Let us just remind that it only reached Timor after the two others, which leads us once more to the notion of political twilight.
The second, less known, more difficult to grasp, because poorly documented, is the spontaneous diaspora of the merchants, mercenaries, adventures and corsairs, who, around 1515, thanks to the loose government of Lopo Soares de Albergaria, started deserting the public service and the official Portuguese positions and spread along the coasts of the Bay of Bengal, from the Far East to the seas of the Archipelago. They were soldiers who hadn't been given their pay, because of the chronic insolvability of the State, or merchants who were quitting the monopoles of the Crown. They formed here and there small merchant republics, rather independent from the power of Goa, the better known of which were Meliapor and Negapattam, in Coromandel, as well as Macao on the southern coast of China. They competed the official undertaking, which sometimes determined the authorities of the l'Estado da Índia to think of starting military expeditions against them; we can argue that until the end of the 17 th century the bishop of Cochin advocated for organizing such expeditions against the Portuguese of Timor, whom he considered to be too autonomous. If none of these projects was finally accomplished, this can be explained by the fact that it would have collided with too many interests in the wings of power in Portuguese India. Apparently, these spontaneous colonies were linked to the merchant networks of the casados (literally, "the married ones"), that is, the former soldiers who had married native women and had permanently established themselves in the Portuguese fortresses of Asia, where they enjoyed certain privileges, especially the exclusivity of the right to be elected in the municipal Benches. Naturally, one generation later these populations, reinforced with converted natives, were mainly mixed; this is why they were called in Portuguese topazes or topasses, a term of Dravidian origin, which means "bilingual", while the Dutch preferred to call them Zwarte Portugeezen, that is "black Portuguese". In the second half of the 16 th century the casados and topazes had become so influential and so detached from the official politics that towards 1560 the rumour was spread that they had taken advantage of the presence in Goa of a viceroy of royal blood, Dom Constantino de Bragança, in order to proclaim the independence of Portuguese India. We know that after the union of the Iberian crowns in 1580 they sent invitations to Dom António, the prior of Crato (the nationalist and popular candidate to the throne of Portugal, ousted by Philip II of Castile) to come into the Indies and reign there. These were probably the facts which persuaded the Spanish kings of Portugal (1580-1640) to deal with some of these merchant colonies, conferring them the status of Portuguese cities and municipalities.
Finally, a third section of the Portuguese presence in Asia was the missionary expansion, which knew a great momentum after the arrival of the first Jesuits in 1542. Its geographical borders often surpassed those of the other lines, getting into Laos, the Mongolian Kingdom and the Tibet, and even reaching the court of the Safavides in the West, at Ispahan, and through it Georgia. It is well known that in Timor the missionaries arrived one century and a half earlier than the first governor, and thus the imperial section of the Portuguese expansion.
Casados, topazes and Dominican missionaries reached Timor through the small island of Solor, which was situated more to the North. Solor lacked economic interest, but possessed a good harbour, sheltered from all the winds. At least starting with the middle of the 16 th century, the Portuguese merchants operating in the area stated to winter here, that is to spend here the North-West monsoon, which brings the rain season. We know that more than 200 merchants spent the winter here in a single year. In order to provide them with religious assistance the Dominicans, who had opened an abbey in Malacca in 1554, the main and almost the only official Portuguese position in South-East Asia, started to send their monks. In 1562 they founded there a second monastery, doubled by a tranqueira or small fortress, in order to defend them against the Javanese pirates who attacked the island from time to time. The commanders of the fort were chosen by the monks; nevertheless, some of them were confirmed in Goa or Madrid through a royal certificate, which gave their authority an official character 23 . Hence, Solor started entering into a darker corner of the East Portuguese Empire.
We know next to nothing about the activities of the Portuguese topazes in the area. It seems that they recruited very early militias of soldiers, acquiring thus military power 24 . The reason which led to this militarization is not very clear; it is certainly linked to the presence of the Dutch, who, starting from 1613 assaulted several times the tranqueira of Solor. In any case, the topazes spread their power to the Larantuka region, which has been governed until now by a mixed family, the Costa, allied to the Hornay family, of Dutch origin, but converted to Catholicism. Their attitude towards the official Portuguese power was a rather ambiguous one: the two families took up the responsibility of "captain-major of the islands of Solor and Timor", created in the mid-17 th century on the demand of the Dominicans; but they managed to be confirmed by the authorities of Goa or Lisbon, as they tried to control the spread of the Dutch interests in the region, but could not prevent the usurpation.
The status quo would have probably been perpetuated if the political economy of the topazes of Timor didn't harm the commercial interests of Macao, the main buyer of sandalwood in the island 25 . The Costa and the Hornay certainly sold it to the highest bidder, be it Chinese or the VOC (Vereenigde Ost-Indische Compagnie, "United East-India Company"), the Dutch company. Indeed, it was the Senate of Macao who intervened with the viceroy and the king so that a governor of the islands of Solor and Macao may be officially named. The first two governors couldn't even land, as the topazes captains prevented them from doing so 26 . If the third, António Coelho Guerreiro, was more fortunate when he came, in 1703, this is explained by the fact that, on the one hand, he was supported by the bishop of Malacca, chased out from his chair by the Dutch who took over it in 1641, and sought refuge in Timor; on the other hand because he knew how to buy the collaboration of the lieutenant in Timor of the captain major Domingos da Costa, who resided in Larantuka, and who named him knight in the Military Order of Christ, of which the King of Portugal was Grand Master 27 .
The importance of Catholicism
As we have already seen, the fidelity of the casados, of the topazes and of the converted towards the Portuguese Crown was often an ambivalent one. On the flip side, there is strong evidence to indicate that rather it was religious solidarity which united them. The fact that nowadays in Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, Bangladesh and Ceylon communities with more or less Portuguese origins have lost any link to Portugal but have remained faithful to Catholicism seems to confirm this hypothesis.
The same happened with Timor. The kingdom of Ocussi, governed by the Métis Portuguese, which had been rapidly christened, will always remain Catholic. Its relationships with the governors sent from Lisbon, who resided there from 1703 to 1769, had gradually deteriorated, forcing governor António José Teles de Meneses to leave Lifau and transfer to Díli, the capital, in the country of the Belu, where the Portuguese had their main support 28 . Henceforth, and until the beginning of the 20 th century, the only sign of submission of Ocussi to the Portuguese Crown was the presence of a customs, as its kings behaved like independent sovereigns. The other kingdoms of of Servião or West Timor, less Christianized, finally accepted Dutch suzerainty and turned to Calvinism. This reversal took place at the end of the 18 th century, following an attack of the topazes of Ocussi against the bordering kingdoms, which determined them to ask the help of the VOC, established at Kupang since 1652. The failure of the topazes in the Penfui battle (November 1749) enabled the opperhooft or captain-major von Pluskow to launch a series of military campaigns (1758-61), which consolidated the position of the Dutch.
On the contrary, most of the countries of the Belu, which had gradually embraced Catholicism, never rejected the Catholic confession, remaining in the sphere of influence of the Portuguese, whose protectorate they had accepted under the circumstances that we have already examined 29 . Hence, the division of Timor in two halves also became, in a sense, a religious division.
At the end of the 18 th century some kingdoms of Servião remained Catholic and faithful to Portugal, especially those of Ocussi and Noemuti. However, Bé-Hali, on which all the kingdoms of País dos Belos depended, at least ritually, had never accepted the Portuguese presence. Indeed, following the major Makassar incursion of 1641, that we have already evoked, Tallo's emissaries had tried to determine the emperor of Bé-Hali to refuse the Portuguese suzerainty, certainly convincing him that the king of Portugal wanted to replace him at the head of the pyramid of vassalage of the Belu confederation, as he actually eventually did. At the same time, they tried to persuade him to convert to Islamism, which lead to a preventive raid, organized by the Portuguese Dominicans in 1642 30 . Bé-Hali was destroyed, lost its prestige and remained hostile to the Portuguese. Thus, while the kingdom of Ocussi, which belonged to Servião, remained under the Portuguese influence, the most western part of the Belu country, the Bé-Hali area, rejected the Portuguese suzerainty and fell into the Dutch one. The border line was established between Portugal and the Netherlands through a series of negotiations which stretched from 1851 to 1916 but, grosso modo, the indigenous kingdoms were the ones who chose between one form of dependence and another.
The division of the island accentuated the distance between the two halves, especially as it doubled it by a religious and cultural difference: on the Portuguese side, Catholicism, promptly embraced by the aristocracy, and, more slowly, by the rest of the population, became an important factor of internal unification and external differentiation. On the Dutch side, Protestantism eventually prevailed; it is nowadays the religion of the Atoni who inhabit most of the Indonesian Timor. This was not the case for the Belu of the border area of Bé-Hali and Atambua, so that 36% of the population of the Indonesian Timor is nowadays Catholic. As we have already seen, due to the Dutch regime some Malay and Muslim influence is also present there, as shown by the presence of significant Muslim minorities, scattered on the island. On the other hand, just as with the South Moluccas, the adoption of Calvinism, which strongly observed the principle of sola scriptura as rule of faith and principle of truth, created, much more than the rather syncretistic Catholicism of the Portuguese missionaries, a clear dislocation of the traditional animist culture. This explains the paradox that West Timor, which had been characterized, for a long time, by an ethnic and linguistic unity much superior to that of the East Timor, does no longer enjoy nowadays the same cultural homogeneity, and seems to have a heterogeneous and loose culture. A Portuguese-speaking inhabitant of Timor who visited for the first time Indonesian Timor in 1974 or 1975 expressed particularly well this impression, as he exclaimed: "we have a culture, they have a project...".
On the religious level, East Timor is thus more related to the neighbouring island of Flores, where there have been, until 1851, Portuguese establishments, and where the vast majority of the population is Catholic, than to the Western half of the island.
As for Ocussi, we can argue that it is for West Timor what Flanders is for the Netherlands: united by the language but separated by the faith. According to the 1970 census, the region of Pante-Makassar, which corresponds to the shore of the kingdom, was, on the side of the Manatuto region, the most christened area of the Portuguese Timor, with more than 80% of Catholics, while the general average of the territory was of only 30%, the rest being animist.
Catholicism, just as the other heritages of the Portuguese cultural influence in Timor-Leste, was easily integrated, certainly because the Portuguese culture was more proposed than imposed. Contrary to what happened in Goa, where the Portuguese cultural contribution was a corollary of the political domination, and in the Philippines, where the same can be said about the Spanish influence, in Timor the religious and cultural influence preceded by more than a century the establishment of the political presence.
The historic singularity of the Portuguese presence on the island shouldn't be disregarded, at the risk of not understanding its history. Timor was not conquered. It was first frequented by merchants about whom we have very little information. Contrary to the clove trade of the Moluccas and the nutmeg trade of the Banda, on which the crown had the monopoly, the sandalwood trade, which was still free, was the prerogative of private merchants, who didn't leave any archives and about whom we do not know very much. Anyhow, it was not the commercial presence which led to the Portuguese political presence on the island, but that of the missionaries established there since 1556, some forty years after the merchants. As we have already noted, the first Portuguese governor only reached Timor in 1703, one century and a half later.
Thus, the religious presence was already more that a century year old when the political and military presence of the Portuguese state was starting to take shape. Just as it happened during the "Christian century" in Japan, almost at the same time, Catholicism was accepted here independently of any relation of domination, just as the Islam had formerly been accepted in most of Indonesia. It is also important to mention that when the first Portuguese governor, António Coelho Guerreiro, landed in Timor in 1703, seventeen kings, chiefs and dignitaries from Timor to whom he offered presents, and the nominal list of whom he provides, already had a name and a nickname, or at least a given name which was Portuguese. They all used the Portuguese nobility prefix dom before the name 31 .
A tacit pactum subjectionis
We should also note the fact that the acceptance of a Portuguese governor resulted from a consensus which was at least a tacit one, as when António Coelho Guerreiro landed accompanied by only 82 men who formed, so to put it, his personal stewards. He could never have conquered Timor with such a small contingent. Of the sixty or so kingdoms which existed in Timor at that time, 25 immediately accepted the Portuguese suzerainty, which enabled him to establish his power. He undertook thus a sort of militarization of the traditional political structure, distributing to the liurais patents of colonels in the Portuguese army, to the chiefs of the suku, their subordinates, patents of commanders and to the village chiefs patents of captain. Thus, he set the basis for a military organisation that was to last for more than three centuries.
Still at the time of Napoleon, when different French expeditions designed to explore Australia stopped over in Timor, the reports that they left underlined the fact that there were not more than 40 soldiers from the regular Portuguese army on the island. It was only in 1818, on the aftermath of the occupation of Atapupu by the Dutch, that a battalion, made mostly of convicts, was sent to Goa and took quarters in Dili. Previously, the defence against the inhabitants of Makassar, against the Dutch and other possible attackers was only assured by the troops of the liurais, or local kings, in their kingdoms, and commanded by a captaingeneral and two lieutenant-generals, the one of Servião and that of Belu (and a third in Larantuka, the headquarters of the Portuguese establishments in Flores), all of them chosen by the liurais. This organisation, which was partly borrowed, modernized and revitalized in the 1960s by the governor Themudo Barata, subsisted until the end of the Portuguese administration in 1975, mainly guarding the Indonesian border.
Certainly, this doesn't mean that the acceptation of the suzerainty, and afterwards of the Portuguese sovereignty, was always accomplished in a peaceful manner. But the many conflicts which marked the history of Timor always consisted, until the end of the 19 th century, in fights between the partido real, the "real party", that is the forces of the kingdoms which were faithful to Portugal, which provided them with arms, and the forces of the "raised" kingdoms, very often armed by the Batavians.
The division of Timor into reinos assentados, "sitting kingdoms", that is pacified, paying their finta or tribute to the King of Portugal, and "raised kingdoms", those who were not paying it, was thus considered to be a rather normal, almost institutionalized phenomenon. It was similar to what was happening in Morocco before the establishment of the French protectorate: the bled el-makhzen, "the treasure countires", formed by all the cities and tribes which recognized the political authority of the sultan and paid him tribute, opposed to "countries of rebelliousness", formed by those that only recognized a religious and symbolic unity, and paid no tribute. Beyond this dichotomy there is an implicit notion of "politic penumbra", which we have evoked above, which applied to Timor under the Portuguese 32 protectorate, but also to Morocco. In the two cases the limit between the submissive zone and the rebellious countries was changing in a puzzling manner, almost like a weather forecast map, which radically alters from one day to the next. There are, however, at least Timor's case, certain constant trends, the main one being fidelity to the Portuguese in the early christened area of Manatuto.
The "pacification campaigns" at the end of the century, and especially those led by governor Celestino da Silva (1894-1908), which had as a result the substitution of the traditional protectorate by a Portuguese administration of a colonial type, were undertaken by troops where over 90% were inhabitants of Timor supplied by the faithful kings, who considered themselves vassals to the crown of Portugal. The main role was played by the "loyal inhabitants of Manatuto", a corps of four companies of volunteers recruited in this very Catholic area, where the Dominicans had had a convent and the Oratorians a seminar.
All this confirms that, as we have already noted, the Portuguese culture was not imposed but proposed in Timor: proposed by the missionaries and not imposed by the governors or the militaries. This idea should be kept in mind in order to understand that, broadly speaking, the Portuguese culture was assimilated by the inhabitants of Timor only as much as they wished, that it was not diffused by the political power or by the administration thought the public school system, which was implemented much later. We should also mention that, at least for the aristocracy, the cultural level of Timor in the 18 th The Portuguese establishments of Solor, Flores and Timor benefited, indeed, beyond the elementary schools, from secondary education institutions since 1597, which was assured by the Dominicans and later by the Oratorians. The contrast with the situation of the Dutch possessionswhere secondary education was only opened to the native population in 1912, and the primary education from 1849 -is striking. If any education was dispensed, this was done through Muslim brotherhoods and associations which were organizing their own schools, outside the Dutch power. The education which was thus delivered was fundamentally Islamic, indifferent if not hostile to the Dutch culture, turning thus these educational institutions into powerful factors of resistance against the colonial domination. One of the great errors that the Indonesians made in Timor was to consider that Timor represented for Portugal what Indonesia represented for Holland, and to wish that the inhabitants of Timor look at them as to deliverers from a domination which was, in the end, easier that the one that they were imposing to them. They couldn't understand that the Islamist culture was essentially a differentiating factor, while here, Catholic culture was a hyphen.
It was the expulsion of the religious orders in 1834 which ruined the entire educative system of Timor, which depended exclusively on the presence of the monks, trowing the territory into a cultural stagnation out of which it could only escape when governor Afonso de Castro (1859-1863) opened a school for the children of the liurais and especially when the bishop of Medeiros, who was responsible for the missions in Timor from 1877 to 1897, created a series of schools, of colleges for girls and even an agriculture school. The main secondary education institution was the Soibada college, granted to the Jesuits until 1898 34 . The first public school was only created in 1915. While education only concerned a small elite, the Portuguese cultural influence has been, during these four centuries of missionary presence, gradually assimilated. It would be an error to measure this influence by the small number of schools functioning in the 19 th century or at the beginning of the 20 th , especially since the culture of Timor was, traditionally, an oral one.
A tradition of freedom
We should also remind that, because of the weakness of the Portuguese power, even under the Lusitanian domination Timor maintained, for centuries, a certain tradition of freedom, even of relative independence; especially the nobles had a particularly strong sense of the contractual nature of their subjection to Portugal, that had conquered their country "by water and salt" (an allusion to the rite of baptism) and not by fire, in the famous syntagm of a liurai of the past. Dependent as it was on the military forces which provided the local kingdoms, the Portuguese presence had to bear with the limits of the consensus fixed by the latter 35 . Since 1725, less than a quarter of a century after the landing of the first governor, the abuses in the collection of the fintas (tributes paid by the different kings in order to support the administration) led to a general uprising against the Portuguese, which remained famous as "the Cailaco war", after the name of the last refuge of the insurgents, where many of them committed suicide in desperation cause 36 . Significantly, their attempt to short-circuit the liurais, replacing the finta with a poll tax perceived directly by the government, had to be abandoned, and it was only reintroduced by Celestino da Silva at the beginning of the 20 th century.
The Apontamentos para um Diccionario Chorographico de Timor, compiled by Raphael das Dores between 1871 and 1891 and published by the Geography Society of Lisbon in 1903, contains information of this type: "Boibau: kingdom inside the island, belonging to the province of Bellos, incorporated into the district and the military commandment of Maubara, but which has been unruly since immemorial times, never paying the finta it is committed to pay, of 9600 reals per annum in kind, neither providing the five auxiliaries for the public works in Dilly to which it is committed". At the same time, more precisely in 1887, the governor Lacerda e Maia, who had imposed himself in order to save his chef de cabinet who had not shown respect to the king of Motadel, was killed with punches and kicks by the local population.
Disregarding the notion of "political penumbra", so important nowadays, it is often said that Timor stayed for four centuries and a half under the Portuguese colonial regime -which, in any case, would only be true when understanding the term "colonial" in a very large sense. In fact, the "former regime" of Timor, which rather corresponds to a period of protectorate, had until the 19 th century a symbiotic character. A good example of this symbiosis is provided by what was happening when, for a reason or another, there was no governor: he was generally replaced by a junta, composed by the bishop (as we have already seen the bishops of Malacca established themselves in Timor after the occupation of the town by the Dutch in 1641 37 ), by the judge and one of the kings.
It is interesting to note the way in which this administrative system mixed with local traditions and culture. For instance, the finta or tribute paid by the different kings to the governor who represented the king of Portugal was traditionally named siripinão, from the Malay sirih, "betel" and pinang, "areca". In Timor, as almost everywhere in South and South-East Asia, the mastication of the betel and of the areca is an important element in social rites, comprising a sense of fraternity and ritual communion. This detail shows the assimilation of the vassalic relationship of the kings of Timor to the Portuguese crown to the Timor cultural universe, where vassality was considered a sacred act and the tribute a semi-religious service, involving a fraternizing rite. On the other hand, the officer patents signed by the King of Portugal and distributed to the chiefs were considered sacred, and kept together with other objects endowed with magic powers in the uma lulik, where the regalia of each kingdom -which can only be exhibited after a sacrifice to the souls of the ancestors -are preserved and venerated. Some of these uma lulik, as the one from Estado, in the district of Ermera, have survived the vicissitudes of the Indonesian occupation.
The traditional regime only started to alter towards the middle of the 19 th century, when the first "military posts" were created inside the country, constituting thus the first frame of the local Portuguese administration, limited until then to the capital. But it is only after the great pacification campaigns of Celestino da Silva (1894-1908) that the Portuguese administration definitely acquired a colonial nature stricto sensu, which didn't prevent the some characteristics of the former regime to perpetuate, such as the existence of a traditional militia, the companhias de moradores about which we have already talked, dependent on the luirais and commanded by the members of their family or by persons chosen by them, which lasted until 1975 38 . Thus, in the full sense of the term there was not a Portuguese colonial administration in Timor for 400 years, but only during the 60 or 70 last years, which is very little when compared to the four centuries of effective religious and cultural presence.
Be it as it may, the Portuguese colonial domination maintained its archaic traits in Timor, and also something of the symbiotic character of the first European expansion, not as brutal as the second, as it was largely an expansion made of collaborations with the local population. Even when the colonial regime was at its peak, under the New State, most of the functionaries were, as we have already noted, from Timor. This clear predominance of the local elements among the functionaries partly explains on the one hand the fact that there were no big movements against the Portuguese army, and on the other hand that the Indonesian intervention was not accepted, as it was based on a massive presence, if not of the civil functionaries, at least of the Indonesian army, which controlled all the power functions.
In addition, it seems that the Indonesian army and the Suharto family appropriated almost 40% of the territory of Timor. If such a number is true -we couldn't find certain information in order to confirm or infirm this data -it means that the Indonesians occupied almost ten times more of the territory than what the Portuguese occupied as private property, as only 7% of the surface of the territory was covered by plantations, half of which belonged to the small and average local producers and, thus, only 3,5% was occupied by the Portuguese plantations. If the Indonesians had appropriated ten times the amount of land appropriated by the Portuguese, even if not all the occupied land was exploited, the weight of the Indonesian economic presence was potentially enormous, a fact which helps us understand why it was badly tolerated.
Be it as it may, the rejection of the integration by the population of Timor may hardly be imputed to economic reasons. It is certain that the inhabitants of Timor distrusted the transmigrasi, that is the establishments of Indonesian soldiers on their territory, as they feared they might become a minority into their own country -as it happened in Goa where the locals, suffocated by the crowds of immigrants from the North of India, do no longer represent the majority of the population. But their attitude towards the transmigrants varied rather according the latter's behaviour. Thus, the Balinese, who had rather good neighbourhood relations with the local populations, were generally well tolerated, even if they occupied the most fertile soils of the territory, in the plains of the South coast and at the mouth of river Loes 39 . On the contrary the population of Makassa, who developed fishing to a degree never reached in Timor 40 before, contributing thus to providing the island with the maritime dimension which it paradoxically lacked, were generally unwelcome, because of their systematic connivance with the occupation authorities. This shows that in order to get a just analysis of the case of Timor one shouldn't only rely on conjectural aspects; if in this historic essay we have insisted especially on the structural side, this is because it naturally fits; the others being more properly the concern of sociology or journalism.
For historic and cultural reasons that we have tried to explain above, through their language, religion and culture, etc., the Indonesians were always seen as strangers in Timor. The ravages of the Indonesian army, who behaved as if it were in a conquered country, only confirmed this impression with the local population, inhibiting the action of the numerous potential factors of union. Apparently, the responsible of the regime were never conscious of this. This error of evaluation has decidedly contributed to the failure of their intervention.
